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INTRODUCTION
 
The U.S. Army combat reconnaissance and ranger campaign of the Vietnam war represented an important military adjunct to regular operations throughout the prolonged conflict. Patrol units were formed as field expedient organizations out of battlefield necessity, and their employment varied according to higher command objectives and terrain dictates. This book examines the actual methodology and contrasting experiences of Army long-range patrol elements by describing recon and ranger operations on a unit-by-unit basis. In this manner, the author has endeavored to provide an accurate and useful account of ranger utilization and lessons learned during the Vietnam era.
 
This volume describes Army combat reconnaissance by focusing on Army long-range patrol units as they originated and were incorporated into ranger components. An overview of ranger advisory and training efforts is also presented. To ease the process of historical review within the context of the larger Vietnam conflict, the reconnaissance record of each command is addressed separately. An overall chronological sequence would have clouded important wartime considerations that determined separate ranger development in different geographical regions. Likewise, strict adherence to the final lettered series (A–P) of the 75th Infantry ranger companies would have infringed unfairly on earlier patrolling organizations with other regimental sequences.
 
The original variant spelling of “Lerp” instead of “Lurp” is preferred within this text. Some recon veterans might be troubled by this relatively minor aspect of terminology, but both alternatives stem from vowel-inserted pronunciations of the official Army abbreviations LRP and LRRP for Long-Range Patrol and Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol, respectively. In the early 1960s the first European-based LRRP detachment members used Lerp as an extraction of long range reconnaissance patrol, a spelling also influenced by the prevalence of “e” as in Germany or Europe. The earlier version is used in this book out of respect for historical seniority, although Lurp later gained more acceptance in Vietnam and among many postwar publications.
 
Ranger elitism is a popular concept, but military history cannot become anchored on fabled exaggeration. Modern ranger concepts must be grounded on a solid foundation of historical objectivity, where a true understanding of ranger strengths and weaknesses might still contribute significantly to today’s national defense. The Army’s combat reconnaissance and ranger record of the Second Indochina War was highlighted by individual valor accented by dedicated professionalism, but it was also marred by occasional tragic misapplication, inadequate training, and general inexperience inherent within the one-year combat tour rotation policy. The narrative thus encompasses ranger successes as well as failures in Vietnam, but latter examples were selected solely to illustrate doctrinal lessons and not intended to disparage unit or individual integrity.
 
During the compilation of this book the author was ably assisted by many ranger and recon veterans, and well served by the military historical records that preserved many facets of the true ranger story in Vietnam. The author is indebted foremost to his excellent ranger instructors while becoming qualified as a Ranger School graduate and to his ranger comrades and superiors while serving as a wartime ranger detachment officer. This primary experience was coupled with the later acquisition of a legal education that facilitated a thorough review of many primary taped combat interviews, court-martial records, official reports of inquiry, and unit after-action reports. These primary sources were either surveyed during the war or researched in government and military archival collections, and they are specified in the endnotes.
 
1
 
RANGER DEVELOPMENT
 
RANGER BACKGROUND
The United States Army ranger traditions were forged in the European struggle for the North American continent that predated the birth of the nation. During the Imperial Wars from 1689 to 1762, the British raised contingents known as American Provincials for specific campaigning operations against Spanish and French forces. These units were formed outside the standard colonial militia system. Officers of the Provincials were selected on the basis of their fighting experience and individual reputations for bravery. The troops were recruited from hardy woodsmen and other rugged volunteers who responded willingly to the prospects of wilderness adventure and inducements of hearty bonuses.
 
Perhaps the most celebrated service rendered by these American Provincials was that of a band of northern colonial rangers led by New Hampshire Major Robert Rogers. His separate Provincial companies, known collectively as “Rogers’ Rangers,” were raised during the French and Indian War. These early rangers accomplished several important tasks, and the passage of centuries has elevated their deeds to near-legendary status. The companies provided valuable reconnoitering services for the regular forces invading Canada, and they performed several long-range raids against both the French and their Indian allies. The term “ranger” became a matter of upcountry or frontier preference, and this title was bestowed on several mounted outfits during the American Revolutionary War.
 
The ranger companies of the Vietnam conflict reflected a very close operational link to Rogers’ Rangers. Both backwoodsmen Provincials and Vietnam-era ranger personnel gained recognition as capable but fiercely independent warriors. The leaders of ranger companies represented carefully selected and seasoned professionals. Troops possessing desired soldiering attributes were offered promotions, extra payment, extended leave, and other incentives to join the ranger ranks. Perhaps even more telling, both types of ranger companies existed as separate ad hoc entities raised beyond the established military structure to undertake special tasks. Like Rogers’ Rangers, the ranger companies in Vietnam were first formed as expedient patrol units to conduct long-range reconnaissance and raids across an extended battleground.
 
During World War II the Army rangers earned considerable combat acclaim. Six ranger infantry battalions and one provisional ranger battalion achieved notable successes while spearheading Allied amphibious assaults and performing special raids in both Europe and the Pacific. These elements shaped a vital part of modern Army ranger legacy. During the Vietnam conflict, however, regular ranger and patrol units were denied any official connection to that ranger service. Instead, the rangers of the Vietnam era traced their lineage to another expedient long-range penetration force: the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), popularly known as “Merrill’s Marauders.”
 
Merrill’s Marauders were a select group of soldiers led by Brig. Gen. Frank D. Merrill during 1944. General Merrill’s force was given the hazardous assignment of penetrating deep behind Japanese lines and executing a crucial military drive across the mountain jungles and malarial valleys of northern Burma. This task was part of a coordinated push by Chinese Army forces that cleared the way for building the Ledo Road and reconnecting China with Allied logistical bases in India.
 
The extended march of the marauders, cut off from overland supply sources and supplied by radio-directed parachute drops, was designed to disrupt enemy communication lines and reach distant Allied objectives. In true ranger fashion, the foot soldiers had to rely on deception, raiding prowess, and skirmishing mobility to stifle or confuse organized Japanese resistance. The final target was the key airfield at Myitkyina on the Irrawaddy River. The capture of this airfield—the only all-weather airstrip within the remote mountain fastness of upper Burma—would enable consolidation of Allied control over the region.
 
The possibility of maneuvering troops deep in enemy territory had already been verified by British Brigadier Orde C. Wingate’s raiding expedition of February–June 1943. The composite British, Indian, Burmese, and Gurkha columns sliced through north Burmese territory, cutting railways and creating widespread havoc, and then dispersed into smaller groups that successfully evaded pursuit battalions and returned to Allied lines before the monsoon rains. This daring exploit captured Merrill’s imagination, and he set about to raise a much larger force that would seize the offensive and clear the pathway for the Ledo Road.
 
In September 1943 the Army began organizing three special battalions known as the Galahad Force. Gen. George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the United States Army, ensured that these battalions were composed of physically hardened volunteers who were acclimatized to the tropics. The troops were derived primarily from veterans of the Solomon-New Guinea campaigns, defenders of Trinidad and Puerto Rico, and well-qualified stateside infantrymen. By the end of October all three battalions arrived in India, where they trained intensively under Brigadier Wingate’s overall supervision through January 1944.
 
On 1 January 1944 the Galahad Force was officially designated as the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) at its training site of Camp Deogarh, India. Acting on Brigadier Wingate’s advice, the Americans split each battalion into two jungle columns with proportionate supporting forces. The resulting self-contained 475-man units were color-coded as the Red, White, Blue, Green, Orange, and Khaki Combat Teams. The soldiers received intense training in scouting, marksmanship, jungle movement, and platoon tactics.
 
On 9 February 1944, Merrill’s Marauders went into combat. Toward the end of the month, led by scouting platoons, the raiders infiltrated along a maze of forested trails and set up positions behind Japanese defensive lines on the southern rim of the Hukawng Valley. The American blocking positions were concentrated in the vicinity of Walawbum, a grassy clearing in the midst of river-laced jungle. The Japanese tried to dislodge the raiders with a series of furious attacks through the fog-shrouded underbrush and stream ravines, but broke off the engagement on 6 March and withdrew from the valley.
 
The long-range unit continued its relentless pursuit of the retreating Japanese 18th Division by marching south toward the narrow Mogaung Valley. Part of the American force sidestepped the main valley road by going on a left-flank hike through the rough hill country. Their forward movement was snared by heavy foliage and occasional Japanese delaying actions, but the marauders chopped pathways through the bamboo thickets and traversed leech-infested streams. The exhausting trek forced the soldiers deeper into heavy jungle, and they slipped past the main Japanese forces. On 28 March the 1st Battalion reached the Japanese-held rear junction of Shaduzup in the upper Mogaung Valley and made a surprise night attack. After over-running the Japanese camp with a classic bayoned charge, the marauders set up a crucial roadblock and held it against repeated counterattacks.
 
In the meantime, the 2d and 3d Battalion columns used native footbridges to cross the Tanai River, while horses and pack mules forded the four-foot-deep water, and established another unexpected block against the Japanese at Inkangahtawng. The raider lines were anchored in heavy jungle patches among grassy lowland clearings, and numerous Japanese counterattacks were defeated in the open elephant grass. On 25 March, both battalions withdrew westward and clashed with a Japanese flanking move on Shaduzup. Sharp fighting escalated with alarming frequency along wooded trails, often ankle-deep in mud, and General Merrill ordered the 2d Battalion to hold the high ground at Nhpum Ga village. The 3d Battalion was charged with maintaining backup positions at the Hsamshingyang airstrip and keeping a trail segment open to Nhpum Ga.
 
By 31 March 1944, several determined Japanese onslaughts completely surrounded and isolated the Nhpum Ga perimeter, and even captured the crucial water hole that supplied the American defenders. This loss forced the raiders to drink swamp water from stagnant pools in a draw littered with mule carcasses. The battle for Nhpum Ga lasted ten days and consisted of enemy artillery barrages and relentless infantry assaults against the beleaguered village position. The 3d Battalion desperately counterattacked to reach its battered comrades at Nhpum Ga, but was thrown back several times. The heavy combat included persistent attacks up sheer slopes dominated by Japanese machine gunners and grenadiers. Finally, on 9 April, relief forces broke through to Nhpum Ga and the Japanese withdrew.