Read an Excerpt

PROLOGUE
 
In the six years’ duration of the Second World War, numerous time periods or particular dates have been described by historians as critical to the outcome of the war. The spring of 1940, which saw the fall of France and the beginning of Nazi domination of the European continent, was one such period. The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 was another. The attack on Pearl Harbor and the Japanese sweep throughout the Pacific in late 1941 and early 1942 must certainly be considered a major influence on the progress of the war. Some historians have claimed that the Battle of Midway in June 1942 was a pivotal event, at least in the war between the United States and Japan. The period most frequently mentioned as the turning point in the fortunes of the various contestants has been the fall of 1942. The Russians’ successful defense of Stalingrad, the British victory at El Alamein, the American invasion of North Africa, and the Guadalcanal campaign in the South Pacific all occurred within a month or two of each other, and their combined influence on the course of the war was significant.
 
Another period deserves to take its place alongside these well-known moments in history. It is the month of August 1944. The Allied campaign in northern Europe, which began with the invasion of Normandy, sealed the fate of the Axis powers. More than any other campaign of the war, it was decisive—it tipped the scales between victory and defeat. Furthermore, it was through the hedgerows and across the plains of France during the month of August that the ultimate outcome of this crucial campaign was decided. The events of these thirty-one days had a major impact on the outcome of World War II.
 
As background to more fully appreciate the significance of these crucial days of August, it would be worthwhile to review briefly the story of the planning and development of the European campaign. It had a rather long and tortuous history, leading up to the climactic day when American, British, and Canadian troops stormed ashore on the beaches of Normandy. The story began just a few months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
 
It is to be considered that the principal target for our first major offensive should be Germany, to be attacked through western Europe. This answer is based on the following reasons:
 
(1) It involves the shortest possible sea routes, thus placing a minimum strain upon shipping.…
 
(2) No matter where our forces are employed, the lines of communication to England must be kept reasonably safe. Therefore, a theater in western Europe does not require a dispersion of escorting and other protective equipment, air and naval.
 
(3) An early beginning toward building up, in Great Britain, air and ground forces, and a forward base, will from the very beginning, carry a certain threat against Germany which should prevent complete concentration against Russia.…
 
(4) Land communications for the invading force are superior to those to be found in any other area from which either enemy can be attacked.…
 
(5) The forward base in England is already supplied with air fields from which a large air force can operate in order to gain, along the coast, the air superiority that is absolutely vital to a successful landing.…
 
(6) The plan offers the only feasible method for employing offensively a major portion of the British combat power.…
 
(7) It attempts to attack our principal enemy while he is engaged on several fronts; hence, speed in preparation is important.
 
The great objection to the plan is the difficulty of organizing, on the shores of western Europe, a force of sufficient strength to meet the hostile opposition that could be brought against it.
 
The success of the plan depends on the following:
 
a. Complete agreement among the Combined Chiefs of Staff that this constitutes our eventual task; and a determination to accomplish all the preparatory work demanded. Proper adjustment of training and production schedules.
 
b. Overwhelming air support.
 
c. Ample landing craft.
 
d. Ample shipping to support the operations from the beginning and to bring U.S. reinforcements rapidly into the theater.
 
e. Husbanding of combat power—to acquire the necessary strength, and avoid the evils of unjustified dispersion.…
 
The above memorandum, dated March 25, 1942, was to Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall from the Operations Division of the War Department. Formerly known as the War Plans Division, the Operations Division (OPD) was entrusted with broad powers to formulate worldwide strategy and direct military operations. This memorandum represented one of the earliest concrete proposals with respect to long-range military strategy since the attack on Pearl Harbor had brought the United States into active participation in the war. It highlighted two important concepts that were to serve as the basic foundation of American military policy throughout the war: the defeat of Germany was to receive priority over the war against Japan in the Pacific, and this defeat could be accomplished most effectively by a major invasion of the continent of western Europe. The author of the memorandum was the new commander of OPD, Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.
 
Marshall had lunch at the White House the day he received the memorandum. Along with the president, Secretary of the Army Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Adm. Ernest King, Gen. Hap Arnold, and Harry Hopkins were also present. Marshall presented the arguments in favor of an attack across the English Channel as outlined in Eisenhower’s memo and received Roosevelt’s approval to proceed with the planning. Within a week, Marshall and Stimson were back at the White House with a final draft of the proposals, which received Roosevelt’s enthusiastic endorsement. Code name BOLERO, the plan called for the invasion of Europe in the summer of 1943 and included a subsidiary plan for a smaller landing in 1942, should events on the continent make such an operation appear feasible.
 
Marshall and Hopkins went to London in the middle of April in order to secure British support for the plan. At a late-night meeting at Chequers, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was the essence of cordiality and told his American guests that he “had no hesitation in accepting the plan.”2 Encouraged by this apparent support of the British allies, Marshall returned with orders for Eisenhower and OPD to put maximum effort into converting the plans into action. Then, at the end of May, he ordered Eisenhower to London to review the problems involved in building up sufficient forces for BOLERO. After a ten-day trip, Eisenhower returned with a recommendation that a position of commander of the European Theater of Operations (ETO) be established to organize, train, and command the American forces to be assigned to the theater. Marshall agreed and, after several days of consideration, appointed Eisenhower to the command.
 
While Eisenhower was crossing the Atlantic to London in the latter part of June to assume his new command, another very distinguished person was traveling in the opposite direction. Winston Churchill was on his way to Washington. British-American concurrence about European military strategy was about to come to an end. The British acceptance of BOLERO in April was based more on their desire to see American troops moving to British soil and delight over the American adoption of the “European first” strategy than on any agreement with the idea of a cross-channel attack. In fact, they were strongly opposed. Memories of heavy British casualties in France during World War I weighed heavily on Churchill and the senior British military commanders. They believed that a strategy of smaller attacks on the periphery of the continent (i.e., Scandinavia and the Mediterranean) would be just as effective in ultimately forcing the collapse of the German enemy, without the heavy casualties they foresaw resulting from the cross-channel attack.
 
It was a bleak summer for British military fortunes, and Churchill recognized in this adversity a way to bend Allied European strategy in a direction more compatible with British interest. The British Eighth Army had its back to the wall in northern Africa, and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was threatening to overrun Egypt and the Nile Valley. Such a loss would be a severe disaster to the entire Allied cause. Meanwhile, nothing had happened in Europe to make any kind of invasion of the continent even remotely possible during 1942. Churchill pointed out that it was unreasonable to permit the growing American forces to remain idle during 1942, particularly while the Russian army was fighting for its life in front of Stalingrad. Therefore, did it not make sense to stage an American landing in North Africa to take the pressure off the British Eighth Army and to begin to build a formidable Allied presence in the Mediterranean area? After several days of discussions with the persuasive Churchill at both the White House and Roosevelt’s family home in Hyde Park, New York, the president agreed, and the American forces that Marshall had planned on using to invade the continent began to be siphoned off to the Mediterranean theater.
 
With this decision, there began an eighteen-month period of contention and disagreement between the British and American high commands over European military strategy and launching an invasion of the European continent. As the commitment to the Mediterranean theater grew, the possibilities of a cross-channel attack became more remote. Throughout this period, Marshall was the adamant, unremitting advocate of invasion, but he was constantly frustrated by his British counterparts. At one point, he even threatened to withdraw American support from the European theater and concentrate on the war in the Pacific. Roosevelt refused to support such a move, however, and Marshall was forced to relent.
 
At the Allied conference in Casablanca in January 1943, the British did agree to the establishment of a combined Allied planning staff to develop plans for a cross-channel attack. Called COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander), it was headed by British Lt. Gen. Frederick Morgan, who was to include both British and Americans on his staff. COSSAC started serious work in April and by August had developed an invasion plan named OVERLORD, which was quite similar to the plan eventually adopted. D day was to be in May 1944.